Hausman & Woodward present an argument for the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) on the basis of a principle they dub 'modularity' ([1999, 2004]). I show that the conclusion of their argument is not in fact the CMC but a substantially weaker proposition. In addition, I show that their argument is invalid and trace this invalidity to two features of modularity, namely, that it is stated in terms of pairwise independence and 'arrow-breaking' interventions. Hausman & Woodward's argument can be rendered valid through a reformulation of modularity, but it is doubtful that the argument so revised provides any substantially new insight regarding the basis of the CMC.
Introduction
The Causal Markov Condition (CMC) asserts that, for any variable X and any set of variables Y that do not include effects of X, X and Y are probabilistically dependent conditional on the direct causes of X (cf. Spirtes et al. [2000] , p. 29). In ([1999] ), Hausman & Woodward argue that some basic principles of a manipulation approach to causation can be used as premises in a proof of the CMC. The most important of these principles is what they call 'modularity'. Modularity asserts that if X is not a cause of Y, then interventions on X do not change the probability distribution of Y. Cartwright ([2002] ) critiques this argument, while Hausman & Woodward ([2004] ) reply with a revised restatement. In this essay, the revised version of Hausman & Woodward' s argument is shown not to be a valid proof of the CMC. This invalidity stems from two features of the modularity principle: it is stated in terms of pairwise independence and with reference to an 'arrow-breaking' definition of intervention.
First, I show that the conclusion of Hausman & Woodward's argument is in fact not the CMC, but the logically weaker proposition that, conditional on its direct causes, a variable is pairwise independent of its non-descendants. Since pairwise independence between X and every member of some set Y does not entail that X and Y are independent, this is not equivalent to the CMC. This difference is significant insofar as the conclusion of Hausman & Woodward's argument, in contrast to the CMC, does not entail that the joint distribution of a set of variables may be decomposed into the product of each variable conditional on its direct causes. Next, I show that Hausman & Woodward's argument for their weaker conclusion is invalid. The most straightforward way to repair the argument is to add premises requiring acyclic causal structure and probabilistically independent error terms. Yet these two premises alone suffice for the CMC in both deterministic and indeterministic systems (cf. Steel [2005] ), thereby rendering modularity superfluous. As a consequence, the only possible role for modularity in support of the CMC would be as premise in an argument for the claim that error terms are probabilistically independent. Hausman & Woodward state that modularity can provide a basis for this assumption, but their argument on this score is unsound because an error term need not be an arrow-breaking intervention.
The proof of independent error terms from modularity can be rendered valid through a strengthening of the modularity principle. In this revised formulation, modularity makes a claim about independence (rather than mere pairwise independence) and applies to error terms as well as arrowbreaking interventions. However, given the premises in force, this strengthened version of modularity is equivalent to the proposition that sets of causally disconnected variables are probabilistically independent, a principle commonly invoked to motivate the assumption of independent error terms. Hence, it is unclear that the reformulated version of modularity provides any substantially new insight regarding the basis of the CMC.
The CMC versus Hausman & Woodward's conclusion
In Spirtes et al. ([2000] , p. 29), the CMC is stated as follows:
Let G be a causal graph with vertex set V and P be a probability distribution over the vertices in V generated by the causal structure represented by G. G and P satisfy the Causal Markov Condition if and only if for every X in V, X is independent of V\(Descendants(X) [ Parents(X)) given Parents(X).
1
The vertices in the graph represent variables, and in what follows I shall simply refer to the vertices of graphs as variables so as to avoid cumbersome circumlocutions. The set V\(Descendants(X) [ Parents(X)) is set of variables in V less the descendants and the parents of the variable X, that is, the nondescendants and non-parents of X. In a directed graph, X is a descendant of Y just in case there is a sequence of arrows leading from X to Y. For example, like this: X ! Z ! Y. Intuitively, the descendants of a variable are its effects. By convention, every variable is a descendant of itself, so V\(Descendants(X) [ Parents(X)) does not include X. The parents of any variable in a directed graph are those variables from which an arrow leads directly to X, like so: V ! X. Intuitively, parents are intended to correspond to direct causes.
The CMC can be equivalently stated by replacing V\(Descendants(X) [ Parents(X)) with V\Descendants(X), since X is obviously independent of its parents conditional on its parents. Let V\Descendants(X) be called the nondescendants of X. The CMC, then, should be understood to entail the following: conditional on its parents, any variable X is independent of any subset of its non-descendants. The conclusion of Hausman & Woodward's argument, though they refer to it as the 'Causal Markov Condition,' is in fact a logically weaker proposition than the CMC. In other words, conditional on its parents, each variable is pairwise independent of its non-descendants. This is also the same proposition that is the conclusion of the revised version of Hausman & Woodward's argument (cf. [2004], p. 147, 152) . However, it is not equivalent to the CMC; specifically, Hausman & Woodward's CM is entailed by but does not entail the CMC. In light of this, I shall call the conclusion of Hausman & Woodward's argument HW so as to avoid confusion.
That HW is entailed by the CMC is obvious, since if X is independent of every subset of its non-descendants conditional on its parents, then X is pairwise independent of its non-descendants conditional on its parents. Less obvious is the fact that the entailment does not go in the other direction. That point is demonstrated by the following probability model. Consider the 1 For continuity with the above discussion, I write X where Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines write W in this definition. 2 That pairwise independence does not entail independence is, however, commonly noted in probability texts (cf. Stirzaker [2003] , pp. 57-8).
set of events {A, B, C}. Pairwise independence of {A, B, C} means that
The above Venn diagram is a model in which the former but not the latter of these two conditions are satisfied.
. Thus, {A, B, C} is pairwise independent but not independent.
The difference between the CMC and HW is significant. One of the most important consequences of the CMC is that the joint distribution of a set of variables can be decomposed into the product of the distribution of each variable conditional on its parents (cf. Pearl [2000] , p.14; Hausman & Woodward [1999] , pp. 531-3). In contrast, HW does not have this 'factorization' characteristic, a point that can be appreciated by reference to the probability model in Figure 1 . Let the random variables X, Y, and Z be the indicator functions of the sets A, B, and C, respectively.
3 Now consider the graph in Figure 2 .
In this graph, there are no causal connections whatever among X, Y, and Z. Thus, if the graph in Figure 2 and its probability distribution satisfy the CMC, then the joint distribution of X, Y, and Z is equal to the product of their marginal distributions. Consequently, the probability model in Figure 1 does not satisfy the CMC with respect to the graph in Figure 2 . But it does satisfy HW with respect to that graph, since in that probability model the variables X, Y, and Z are pairwise independent. So, unlike the CMC, HW does not entail that the joint distribution of a set of variables can be decomposed into the product of each variable conditional on its parents. Although the conclusion of Hausman & Woodward's argument is not the CMC, it is nevertheless of interest to consider whether their argument is valid. Presumably weaker premises suffice for HW, and clarifying how this is so might be useful for situations in which only HW is needed. Unfortunately, Hausman & Woodward's argument provides no such insights. In the next section, I show that their attempted proof of HW is not valid, and moreover that shoring it up involves adding premises that entail the CMC and render modularity superfluous.
Hausman & Woodward's argument
Hausman & Woodward formulate their revised argument in the form of a proof with numbered propositions ([2004] , p. 152). In this section, I show that this argument is valid only given the additional assumptions that the causal structure is acyclic and that error terms are independent. Since the misstep occurs in the first three lines of their argument, I reproduce only those.
For all
2. For all X i in V, no omitted cause of X i (that is, no cause that contributes to the total effect summarized by U i ) is an effect of any variable in V or of any cause of a variable in V other than X i , nor is any omitted cause of X i a cause of any variable in V except via causing X i . (the error-variable idealization)
(From 1 and 2, the determination of probabilities assumption and the definition of an intervention) (ibid) I claim that the inference from 1 and 2 to 3 is invalid. To see why this is so, it is first necessary to explain some of the terminology.
says that the probability distribution on X j is unchanged by interventions on X i . Thus, premise 1 is a statement of modularity. The second premise can be stated more simply as follows: every error term is a direct cause of exactly one variable in V and is causally connected only with that variable and its effects. 4 For example, consider the following graph ( Figure 3 ). In this case, the error terms are U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 . Each error term is a direct cause of exactly one variable, and is the effect of no other variable in the graph (i.e. is exogenous). X j ? U i | pa i says that X j is probabilistically independent of U i (the error term for X i ) conditional on the set of direct causes of X i (not including U i ), a set which is denoted by pa i . Finally, the 'determination of probabilities assumption' asserts that, in the case of indeterministic causation, the probability distribution of each variable is determined by its direct causes. For simplicity, I shall restrict my discussion to deterministic examples, so the determination of probabilities assumption can be disregarded in what follows.
It is straightforward to produce an example in which 1 and 2 are true but 3 is false. In fact, the graph in Figure 3 constitutes such a counterexample given a few mild assumptions. Suppose that the graph represents a linear causal system in which the error terms, U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 are probabilistically independent. Then it follows that any pair of {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 } that is d-separated conditional on a subset of the others is also probabilistically independent conditional on that subset (cf. Richardson and Spirtes [1999] ).
5 Conversely, all d-connected pairs of {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 } are probabilistically dependent in Figure 3 so long as the paths between X 1 and X 2 do not exactly cancel one another out, and the variance of each error term is strictly greater than zero. Given these fairly standard assumptions, the graph in Figure 3 can be shown to be a counterexample to the inference from 1 and 2 to 3. We have already noted that the graph satisfies premise 2, which required that each error term be exogenous and a direct cause of exactly one variable. Moreover, the graph also satisfies modularity. For example, an intervention on X 1 would be replaced by the graph in (Figure 4) .
If Z is probabilistically independent of the error terms, then it is obvious that modularity is satisfied. For in that case, the distributions of U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and X 3 remain unchanged under the intervention. The cases of interventions on X 2 and X 3 are similar. So, the graph in Figure 3 satisfies premises 1 and 2 of Hausman & Woodward's argument. But it is easy to see that proposition 3 is false of that graph. Since modularity holds,
, that is, an intervention X 1 on does not alter the probability distribution of X 3 . But X 3 and X 1 are d-connected conditional on {X 2 }; hence, X 3 and X 1 are probabilistically dependent conditional on {X 2 }. But {X 2 } ¼ pa 1 , so it is not the case that X 3 ? X 1 | pa 1 . Yet since U 1 accounts for any variation in X 1 not due to X 2 , this entails that it is also false that X 3 ? U 1 | pa 1 . Thus,
but it is false that X 3 ? U 1 | pa 1 , which contradicts proposition 3.
Notice that this counterexample depends upon the cycle between X 1 and X 2 . Consequently, the above example shows that Hausman & Woodward's argument is not valid for cyclic causal systems. It is plausible that Hausman & Woodward mean to restrict the scope of their argument to acyclic causal structures.
6 Yet even if the argument is restricted in this way, the inference from 1 and 2 to 3 is still invalid. To see why, consider the acyclic graph in Figure 5 . Again this graph satisfies premise 2, and it also satisfies modularity as long as interventions are probabilistically independent of the error terms. We can even suppose that the error terms are pairwise independent. Nevertheless, 3 may be false. Consider again the probability model in Figure 1 . Let U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 be the indicator functions of the sets A, B, and C, respectively. In addition, let X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 be binary, and suppose that the causal relationships are as specified by the model in Figure 6 :
, that is, an intervention on X 3 does not change the probability distribution of X 1 . But contrary to the third line of Hausman & Woodward's argument, X 1 and U 3 are probabilistically dependent on {X 2 } ¼ pa 3 . This can be seen as follows. Since X 2 ¼ U 2 , X 1 ? U 3 | {X 2 } is equivalent to X 1 ? U 3 | {U 2 }. Likewise, X 1 ¼ U 1 U 2 , which entails that {v:
Thus, the falsity of X 1 ? U 3 | {U 2 }, follows from the fact that Figure 4 . An intervention.
6 Indeed, Hausman confirmed this in personal communication.
1/2 Â 5/16 ¼ 5/32. Hence, even restricting attention to acyclic graphs, Hausman & Woodward's argument is not a valid proof of HW-the claim that, conditional on their direct causes, variables are pairwise independent of their non-effects. Introducing the premise that error terms are independent would block this counterexample but would also render modularity superfluous, since independent error terms suffice for the CMC with regard to both deterministic and indeterministic acyclic causal systems (Steel [2005] ). Since modularity seems entirely unrelated to whether the causal structure is cyclic or acyclic, modularity can be relevant to an argument for the CMC only if it supports the assumption that exogenous variables are probabilistically independent. And in fact, Hausman & Woodward maintain that modularity can perform this function.
Modularity and independent error terms
Hausman & Woodward state that premises 1 and 2 of their argument entail that error terms are independent.
Since the error-variable idealization states that U i does not cause any other omitted variable and does not cause any member of V except by virtue of causing X i , [modularity] implies that U i is probabilistically independent of all the other omitted causes and of all variables in V except effects of X i . ([2004], pp. 152-3) There are two difficulties with this reasoning. First, since modularity makes a claim only regarding pairwise independence, it cannot establish the independence of error terms. The second difficulty is that Hausman & Woodward present modularity as a statement concerning interventions, but interventions and error terms are two different things. Hence, it is unclear that modularity To see the second problem, note that Hausman & Woodward utilize what they call an 'arrow-breaking' definition of intervention ([2004], pp. 149-50) . According to such a definition, an intervention on a variable X is exogenous, is a direct cause of X and no other variable in the system, and when 'on' eliminates the influence of any other cause of X. For example, the graph in Figure 4 represents an intervention on X 1 . The elimination of the influence of other causes of X 1 is indicated in Figure 4 by the deletion of all arrows into X 1 from its erstwhile causes seen in Figure 3 , wherein the intervention is 'off.' 7 Thus, arrow-breaking interventions are so called because switching the intervention on breaks arrows that would otherwise point into the targeted variable. Given the assumption that any error term is an exogenous cause of exactly one variable in the system (i.e. premise 2), every error term satisfies the first two requirements of an intervention. However, error terms need not be arrow-breaking. For instance, in Figure 5 , both X 2 and U 3 affect X 3 . So, modularity can have implications concerning error terms only if error terms, under some appropriate circumstances, qualify as interventions. Hausman & Woodward advance a proposition of just this sort: 'given the errorvariable idealization, if the parents of a variable are held fixed, then the variable representing the effect of the complete set of omitted causes satisfies the definition of an intervention ' ([2004] , pp. 151-2). The phrase 'parents of a variable are held fixed' should apparently be interpreted as 'conditional on the parents of the variable' in this sentence, since their argument makes reference to conditioning on parents but no mention of fixing the values of parents by intervention. Thus, we can state Hausman & Woodward's new premise as follows:
(P) Conditional on pa i , U i satisfies the requirements for an intervention on X i . Where pa i is the parents of X i and U i is the error term for X i . 8 The thought behind (P) is that conditioning on the parents of a variable makes it just as if the causal influences from the parents had been eliminated, thereby transforming that variable's error term into an intervention. For example, 7 The requirement that an intervention, when 'on,' eliminates the influence of all other causes upon its target is item (2) of Hausman & Woodward's definition of an intervention ([2004] , pp. 149-50). Woodward ([2003] , pp. 98) also uses an arrow-breaking definition of intervention. Hausman & Woodward ([1999] ) is ambiguous on this score, leaving the arrow-breaking condition out of the definition (p. 535) but later making claims about interventions that would be true only if it were included (p. 536). 8 Even granting (P), it is unclear how the independence of error terms would follow, since (P) and modularity would seem only to establish that each error term is independent of others conditional on the parents of its target variable. However, I shall not explore this issue, because I believe that there are good reasons to think (P) is false.
consider again the error term U 3 and its target X 3 in Figure 5 . Imagine a subpopulation in which the value of the sole parent of X 3 , namely X 2 , is constant. Hausman & Woodward's reasoning is apparently that in such a population, U 3 is the only cause of X 3 . Consequently, in this subpopulation, there are no other causes of X 3 whose influence U 3 must eliminate, which means that the requirement that U 3 block the effect of all other causes of X 3 is trivially satisfied. Hence, (P) rests on the premise that any causal influences emanating from a variable are eliminated in subpopulations in which the value of that variable is constant. This last claim is in fact a consequence of a proposition that Hausman elsewhere calls the counterfactual operationalizing assumption, or COA for short (Hausman [1998] , p. 246). COA asserts that variables X and Y are causally connected conditional on a set of variables S if and only if X and Y are probabilistically dependent conditional on S. Clearly, this entails that X is not a cause of Y when X is included in S, and hence that parents cease to be causes when conditioned upon, as (P) maintains. But this implication of COA is quite dubious. For example, it entails that HIV does not cause AIDS among any group consisting solely of individuals infected with the virus. This is an odd consequence to say the least. Blocking the effect of HIV upon AIDS would involve something like administering an antiretroviral therapy that fully arrests the infection, while restricting attention to sets of individuals who have been infected does nothing of the kind. There is, then, good reason to reject the claim that conditioning on a variable eliminates all influence that it would otherwise exert upon other variables.
The faults of Hausman & Woodward's argument arise from two features of modularity: it only makes a claim about arrow-breaking interventions and pairwise independence. This suggests that the argument can be rendered valid through a reformulation of modularity that avoids these two features. Let us say that a variable is an instrument with respect to a causal system just in case it is a direct cause of exactly one variable in the system and is causally connected only to that variable and its effects. For example, the error terms in Figures 3 and 5 would qualify as instruments. The desired formulation of modularity can then be stated as follows.
Modularity for Instruments:
If V is an instrument with respect to the causal system S, then V is probabilistically independent of any subset of variables in S that does not include any effects of V.
Given that error terms are instruments (i.e. premise 2 of Hausman & Woodward's argument) and modularity for instruments, the independence of error terms follows straightaway. For suppose the set of error terms is {U 1 , . . . , U n }. Since error terms are assumed to be instruments, modularity for instruments entails that the joint probability distribution of {U 1 , . . . , U n } equals P(U 1 )P(U 2 , . . . , U n ). Likewise, P(U 2 , . . . , U n ) equals P(U 2 )P(U 3 , . . . , U n ). Thus, by reiterated applications of modularity for instruments, we have that the joint distribution equals the product of the marginal distributions, which is to say that the error terms are independent.
The pertinent question about this revised argument is whether it provides any substantially new basis for assuming the independence of error terms. The usual motivation for that assumption is an appeal to a generalized version of the principle of the common cause (PCC; cf. Pearl [2000] , p. 30). The PCC asserts that if two variables are probabilistically dependent, then one is a cause of the other or there is a common cause of both. Or equivalently, if there is no causal connection between two variables, then they are probabilistically independent. In these two formulations, the PCC is a claim only about pairwise independence. But the principle is naturally generalized like so:
Generalized PCC: Any set of variables among which there are no causal connections is probabilistically independent.
It is obvious that modularity for instruments is a consequence of this principle, since an instrument is causally connected only to its effects. Moreover, given that one restricts attention to acyclic causal structures and that error terms are instruments, modularity for instruments entails the generalized PCC. For as shown in the foregoing paragraph, modularity for instruments together with the premise that error terms are instruments entails that error terms are independent. Yet independence of error terms and acyclic causal structure suffice for the CMC (Steel [2005] ). And the CMC entails the generalized PCC.
In other words, given premises in force in Hausman & Woodward's argument-that the causal structures of interest are acyclic and error terms are instruments-modularity for instruments is equivalent to the generalized PCC. The latter principle, meanwhile, is the one usually called upon to justify the assumption that exogenous error terms are probabilistically independent. Thus, it is unclear how Hausman & Woodward's argument strengthens preexisting motivations for the CMC.
Conclusion
The CMC rests on two conditions: acyclic causal structure and probabilistically independent error terms. Thus, any deeper justification of the CMC than that currently available must either devise a generalized version of the CMC that can be shown to hold for cyclic causal structures, or provide an account of why exogenous error terms should be independent. Some progress has already been made on the first project (cf. Richardson and Spirtes [1999] ), but the second remains unexplored territory. Hausman & Woodward's argument can be viewed as an intriguing attempt to fill this lacuna, but unfortunately one that is unsuccessful.
Several difficulties with Hausman & Woodward's argument have been discussed here. First, the conclusion of their argument is in fact not the CMC but a substantially weaker proposition that lacks some of the CMC's characteristic features. In addition, their argument is not valid unless it is assumed that the causal structure is acyclic and error terms are independent, assumptions that render modularity superfluous. The only way to make modularity relevant is to show that it can support the assumption that error terms are independent, which Hausman & Woodward claim to do. However, this argument depends on the doubtful premise that conditioning on a variable eliminates causal influences that would otherwise emanate from it. It is possible to revise Hausman & Woodward's argument from modularity to the independence of error terms, but it is unclear that the resulting argument is substantially distinct from the usual motivation given for assuming error terms to be independent.
Appendix: D-separation
D-separation is a graphical concept whose interest lies in the following, highly non-trivial fact: for directed acyclic graphs, D-separation indicates exactly those conditional and marginal probabilistic independencies entailed by the CMC (cf. Pearl [2000] , p. 18). As noted in Section 3, D-separation also characterizes exactly those probabilistic independencies entailed by linear cyclic structures with independent error terms (Richardson and Spirtes [1999] ). D-separation is defined by Pearl as follows:
A path p is said to be d-separated (or blocked) by a set of nodes Z if and only if 1. p contains a chain i ! m ! j or a fork i m ! j such that the middle node m is in Z, or 2. p contains an inverted fork (or collider) i ! m j such that the middle node m is not in Z and such that no descendant of m is in Z.
A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y if and only if Z blocks every path from a node in X to a node in Y. (Pearl [2000], pp. 16-7) For example in Figure 5 , X 1 and X 3 are not d-separated conditional on the empty set, but they are d-separated conditional on {X 2 }. In Figure 3 , U 1 and U 2 are d-separated by the empty set but not by {X 2 }. In this case, conditioning on the collider X 2 activates the path U 1 ! X 1 ! X 2 U 2 .
